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The Utah Federal Court's Ban on 
Sketching of Courtroom Scenes 
M .  Dallas Burnett* 
Few constitutional rights are more fragile than those dealing with the 
rights of free expression protected by the first amendment. The history 
of press and speech freedom in the United States is littered with local, 
state, and federal laws that have violated the letter and spirit of the con- 
stitutional guarantees.' Over the years the judiciary has played a major 
role in preserving free expression against these attacks, but some courts 
have also taken a turn at the undermining process.2 A recent example of 
judicial infringement on freedom of the press and expression took place 
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah in 1969 and 
1973. That attack came in the form of a 1969 order prohibiting sketch- 
ing in the courtroom and its environs and a 1973 amendment thereto 
extending the prohibition to drawings of courtroom scenes regardless of 
where made. 
On May 8, 1969, Utah's federal district court promulgated a general 
order prohibiting "the taking of photographs in any form, including the 
taking of television pictures, and the making of artist's drawings, cartoons, 
or caricatures in any form . . . in the courtroom or its environs . . . 
*Professor of Communications, Chairman of the Department of Communications, Brigham 
Young University. B.S., 1954, Brigham Young University; M.S.J., 1957, Ph.D., 1967, North- 
western University. 
The author acknowledges the valuable research and editorial assistance rendered by Monte 
Stewart of the Brigham Young University Law Review in the preparation of this article. 
'Anyone's "dishonor roll" would have to include the Alien and Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 
596 (1798) (expired 1801) which made it a felony to publish any writing with an intent to 
resist, oppose, or defeat any law or act of Congress or the President. Also, the New York 
statute upheld in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), prohibiting the publication of 
any writing advising or teaching that organized government should be overthrown by any 
unlawful means. And the Minnesota statute struck down in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931), which provided that any malicious, scandalous, and defamatory publication could 
be declared a nuisance and further publication thereof enjoined. 
21n 1826 a federal district court judge in Missouri, James H. Peck, held in contempt and 
disbarred one Luke Lawless for publishing in a local newspaper an article criticizing a deci- 
sion of the judge. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L. 
REV. 401,423-31 (1928). 
In 1938, a labor leader in California sent a telegram to Frances Perkins, Rocsevelt's Secre- 
tary of Labor, in which he criticized a decision, calling it "outrageous," of a state trial court 
judge. The  labor leader was held in contempt. His conviction was upheld by the California 
Supreme Court, Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939), but reversed 
by a unanimous United States Supreme Court, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
Also in 1938, a newspaper in Los Angeles published a series of editorials commenting on  
certain trials. The  newspaper was held in contempt. On appeal to the California Supreme 
Court, the conviction was upheld because the judicial proceedings commented on by the 
offending editorials had not reached "such a point of finality as to form a proper subject of 
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whether the court is in session or not."3 The order went uncontested. 
On January 26, 1973, when drawings of a civil rights trial in federal court 
were broadcast by a Salt Lake City television station, several staff mem- 
bers of the station were immediately ordered into court to show cause 
why they should not be held in contempt for violation of the 1969 general 
order. That hearing established that the drawings had been made in the 
television studios from the artist's memory. The judge presiding at the 
hearing dismissed the show cause order' but then amended the general 
order to prohibit the making of "cartoons, artists' drawings caricatures, 
or whatever they may be called, [whether] made on these premises or 
elsewhere. "5 
This article will discuss the constitutionality of that order, particularly 
the 1973 amendment that extends the authority of the judge from the 
comment" and " [lliberty of the press is subordinated to the independence of the judici- 
ary . . . ." Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 106, 1 18, 98 P.2d 1029, 1033, 
1044 (1940). T h e  conviction was reversed by a unanimous United States Supreme Court. 
Bridges v. California, supra. 
See also United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972). 
3General Order of the United States District Court for the District of Utah (May 8, 1969) 
(emphasis added). The complete order reads: 
Pursuant to the recommendation and resolution of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States adopted March 8, 1962, the taking of photographs in any form, including 
the taking of television pictures, and the making of artist's drawings, cartoons or cari- 
catures in any form, and the broadcasting or recording for broadcasting by radio, tele- 
vision or other means, in the courtroom or its environs in connection with any judicial 
proceedings are hereby prohibited, whether court is actually in session or not. 
The  term "environs" as used in this order means any place in the Post Ofice and 
Federal Courthouse located at Fourth South and Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This rule does not apply to the use of copying machines such as Xerox. The court may 
permit photographs to be taken or recordings to be made by or under the direction of 
counsel and under such conditions as may be directed by the court. Dated this 8th day 
of May, 1969. 
It should be noted that the 1962 report of the Judicial Conference, to which reference was 
made, contained no provisions whatsoever on sketching. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 9-10 (1962). The  limited references to sketching found in a 1968 report of a 
Judicial Conference committee, COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY 
SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE (1968) (reported in 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969)) [here- 
inafter referred to as Kaufman Report], are discussed in text accompanying notes 21-24 infra. 
4Transcript of Proceedings, In re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, proceedings 
of Feb. 2, 1973). 
51d. at 38-39. 
The  Utah district currently has two active federal district court judges: Chief Judge Willis 
W. Ritter and Judge Aldon J. Anderson. The 1969 general order appeared over the signature 
of Chief Judge Ritter. Chief Judge Ritter was also the presiding judge at the 1973 hearing 
and it was he who at that hearing promulgated the amendment extending the sketching ban 
to all sketches of courtroom scenes regardless where made. 
Judge Anderson has indicated that the practice in his court regarding sketching is uniform 
with the practice in Chief Judge Ritter's court. Interview with Judge Aldon J .  Anderson, 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah (telephone), Jan. 20, 
1975. Though Judge Anderson prohibits in-court sketching, it is unclear whether he views 
the prohibition as extending to sketches made from memory. 
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courtroom and its environs to the desks of those who make news decisions 
for the press. 
For centuries, sketches have been used to report judicial proceedings 
to the nonattending public. Particularly in America, sketches of court- 
room scenes have been a widely used news-reporting medium. Scenes 
from the Salem witchcraft  trial^,^ the trials of religious nonconformists 
Roger Williams7 and Anne Hutch ins~n ,~  and the free press trial of John 
Peter Zengerg were sketched by eyewitnesses and contemporaneously 
published. In fact, few if any notable trials - from those early colonial 
trials mentioned above to the recent trials of the Watergate conspirators - 
have failed to be recorded for news publication by artists present at the 
proceedings. lo 
In the present century, because of the advent of modern photography 
and photojournalism, the use of sketches for general news purposes has 
waned. Yet sketches of in-court scenes continue to be widely used be- 
cause of the nearly universal ban imposed by the American judiciary on 
the use of television or photography equipment in the courtrooms.ll 
Indeed, sketches of in-court scenes, under presently existing strictures, 
constitute the only visual medium by which the news of the courtroom 
can be conveyed to the general public. 
Sketches of courtroom scenes are particularly important to television 
news reporting. Severely limited - compared to the newspaper - in 
the number of minutes and words it can employ to convey the news, the 
television news program compensates with greater use of sight, sound, 
and movement. The unique advantage of television news reporting is 
its ability to let the viewer see the news. Deprived of the use of sketches 
of courtroom scenes, the television news program is reduced - if it is to 
report the goings-on at judicial proceedings at all - to a reading over the 
air of an abbreviated newspaper account.12 
6W.C.H. WOOD 8c R. GABRIEL, AMERICA: ITS PEOPLE AND VALUES 75 (1971) [hereinafter cited 
as WOOD]. 
'H. B. WILDER, D. LUDLUM 8c P. BROWN, THIS ISAMERICA'S STORY 107 (3d ed. 1968). 
*WOOD 77. 
91d. at 112. 
1°B. AYMAR 8c E. SAGARIN, A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S GREAT TRIALS FROM 
SOCRATES TO EICHMAN (1967) contains an extensive collection of sketches, drawings, and paint- 
ings depicting trials and judicial proceedings through the centuries. 
"The ban on photography and television in the courtroom is discussed at note 13 infra. 
The wide use of trial sketches is demonstrated by the fact that the National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC), in 1973, televised nationally on the NBC Nightly News at least 49 sketches 
of trial scenes. Brief for Applicant at 5, Application of National Broadcasting Co., 64 N. J. 476, 
317 A.2d 695 (1974). There is evidence that similar extensive use of such sketches is made by 
the other national television networks. Id. 
12See COLUMHI A BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., TELEVISION NEWS REPORTING 1 16 (1 958), where 
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But despite its unobtrusive nature and its long tradition as a news con- 
veying tool, the sketching of courtroom scenes has sometimes been re- 
stricted by rules aimed at curtailing media coverage of trials generally.l3 
television's dependence on visual representations is explained: 
Because one of its chief concerns is to allow its viewer to see the news, television has freed 
itself from the obligation of the newspaper to make the news clear through printed words. 
Its purpose is to outline, to bring to its audience's eye and mind much of the same news 
a paper prints. In many ways, the television news program faces what seem insurmount- 
able obstacles; so it appears that its problems are far more complex than those of a news- 
paper. Its dimensions, though less than the newspaper's in terms of time and space, are 
increased in the areas of sight, sound, and movement. Television news has these three 
vital and essential qualities to help it report the news. 
13Historically in America, the promulgation of judicial restrictions on media coverage of 
trials has occurred as the third phase of a three-fold phenomenon. The first element of the 
phenomenon is the crime or other underlying fact situation with its resulting trial, all marked 
by a particular convergence of personalities, facts, and circumstances that make for heightened 
newsworthiness. Second, the media then responds with extensive and pervasive pretrial and 
trial coverage. The affair becomes notorious, heavily publicized, and highly sensational; public 
interest in the proceedings becomes intense. A judicial reaction to all this often follows. The 
judiciary declares that the extensive coverage and attendant public interest was detrimental 
to the right of the accused to a fair trial and to the essential dignity of judicial proceedings 
and therefore promulgates orders restricting media coverage of future cases. This three-fold 
pattern has appeared repeatedly in the present century. 
The trial of Bruno Hauptmann, the alleged kidnapper of the Lindbergh child, was ac- 
companied by probably the most massive pretrial and trial publicity of any criminal case in 
American history up to that time. The trial itself was broadcast live over the radio. See 
S. WHIPPLE, THE TRIAL OF BRUNO RICHARD HAUF~MANN 46-47 (no date); G. WALLER, KIDNAP: 
THE STORY OF THE LINDBERGH CASE 252-53 (1961). After conviction, Hauptmann appealed, 
assigning as error, inter alia, the massive and prejudicial pretrail publicity and the confusion 
caused during trial by members of the press, their clerks, and messenger boys. The convic- 
tion was upheld, State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert. denied, 
296 US. 649 (1935), and Hauptmann was executed. S. WHIPPLE, supra at 88-89. But the 
trial acted as a catalyst in the legal profession and intensified the concern with "the dangers 
attendant upon the use of radio in connection with trials." See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 
596-601 (1965) (appendix to opinion of Harlan, J., concurring, consisting of portions of 
amicus curiae brief of the American Bar Association). See also 62 A.B.A. REP. 851-66 (1937). 
In 1937, the American Bar Association adopted canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics 
which barred taking of photographs in the courtroom and the broadcasting of court pro- 
ceedings. 62 A.B.A. REP. 1 123, 1 134 (1937). The canon originally read: 
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The 
taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses between 
sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the 
essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with 
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted. 
With the advent of television, canon 35 was amended by inserting a ban on the "televising" 
of court proceedings. 77 A.B.A. REP. 110-1 1 (1952). A large majority of the states adopted 
canon 35 and in 1946 the essence of the canon was embodied in rule 53 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure which now reads: 
The taking of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial pro- 
ceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court room shall not be 
permitted by the court. 
Both canon 35 and rule 53 were aimed at media coverage of trial proceedings. Neither 
attempted to reach or deal with pretrial publicity. In 1959, however, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction solely because of prejudicial news articles read 
by the jurors. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). The scope and potential impact 
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of that decision were limited, though, because it was based on supervisory and not constitu- 
tional grounds. Yet within 2 years, the Court invoked the due process clause to strike down a 
murder conviction of a state court on the ground that massive adverse publicity had created an 
atmosphere of "sustained excitement," "strong prejudice," and "public passion." Irvin v. 
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). This opened the floodgate on appeals alleging prejudicial pub- 
licity resulting in denial of due process. See R. Ainsworth, Fair Trial - Free Press, 45 F.R.D. 
417, 419 (1969). Supreme Court activity in the area of prejudicial publicity in criminal trials 
continued, reaching a peak in the 1965 and 1966 terms with decisions in the cases of Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
In 1962, when Texas brought criminal charges against the fertilizer tank swindler, Billie 
Sol Estes, it was only one of two states not subscribing to canon 35; in Texas, broadcasting of 
trials was allowed in certain circumstances. JUDICIAL CANON 28 OF THE INTEGRATED STATE 
BAR OF TEXAS, 27 TEX. B.J. 102 (1964). The  trial of Estes received nationwide publicity and 
parts of the proceedings were televised. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was de- 
prived of due process because of the confusion in the courtroom caused by large numbers of 
rather too eager photographers and the subtle psychological impact that awareness of the 
televising was deemed to have on all trial participants. Estes v. Texas, supra. But the deci- 
sion rendered in the Sheppard case was to have ultimately the greatest impact on press cover- 
age of judicial proceedings. 
Dr. Sam Sheppard was accused of the murder ofhis young, pretty, and pregnant wife. During 
the course of the investigation, and on through trial, every detail of the crime was widely 
publicized. The newspapers in the area, in front-page stories, began calling for the arrest of 
Sheppard. After the arrest, the newspapers and other media alleged the defendant to be "a 
bare-faced liar," a "Jekyll-Hyde," and a "perjuror." Much emphasis was placed on the de- 
fendant's love affair with another woman, and wide circulation was given to the claim of a 
woman convict that Sheppard was the father of her illegitimate child. The  trial itself was 
later described by appellate courts as amounting to a carnival and a Roman holiday because 
of the activities of the press. The Supreme Court reversed Dr. Sheppard's conviction on the 
grounds that massive prejudicial publicity and pervasive news coverage of the trial had de- 
prived the defendant of due process and a fair trial. Yet the Court went further: it recom- 
mended and even demanded that courts in the future take remedial measures to prevent 
"prejudice at its inception." Specifically, the Court (1) emphasized the power inherent in the 
trial judge to control and even limit the presence of the press in the courtroom and environs; 
(2) stated that the trial court should have insulated the witnesses; and most importantly, (3) 
concluded that the trial court shouId have prohibited extrajudicial statements prejudicial 
to the defendant made by any person subject to the court's control: parties, witnesses, attorneys, 
court officials, and law enforcement officers. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra. 
Following Sheppard there was a spate of reports recommending guidelines for and limita- 
tions on media coverage of judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Kaufman Report, note 3 supra; 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS - TENTATIVE 
DRAFT (1966) APPROVED RAFT (1968) [hereinafter cited as Reardon Report] ; ASSOCIATION F 
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMIITEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE 
ADMINI~TRATION OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, FINAL REPORT WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1967) [hereinafter cited as the Illedina Report]. Some recommendations 
were incorporated into the local rules of various state and federal trial courts. T h e  central 
theme of the reports was that trial courts could, and in appropriate cases should, prohibit the 
divulgence, by persons connected with the case, of information prejudicial to the parties or 
otherwise inimical to a fair trial. Because of recognized constitutional strictures, the reports 
generally recommended that no ban be placed on or penalty imposed for publication of any 
information regarding a case once divulged. For example, the Kaufman Report stated: 
The Committee does not presently recommend any direct curb or restraint on publica- 
tion by the press of potentially prejudicial material. Such a curb, it feels, is both unwise 
as a matter of policy and poses serious constitutional problems. 
Id. at 45 F.R.D. 401-02 (emphasis added). Evidence has appeared establishing that in some 
jurisdictions, trial courts are with increasing frequency imposing bans on prosecutors, police 
officers, witnesses, and others from divulging information in criminal cases likely to receive 
pretrial publicity. See Warren & Abell, Free Press - Fair Trial: The "Gag Order," A Cali- 
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In 1949, New Jersey became the first state jurisdiction to ban sketching 
in the courtroom.14 Prior to that year, the New Jersey courts had oper- 
ated under canon 35 of the American Bar Association's Judicial Canons 
of Ethics which banned photography and television from the courtroom 
but was silent as to sketching.lS But the New Jersey Supreme Court then 
amended the canon to provide that "the making of sketches of the court- 
room or of any persons in it during sessions of the court or recesses be- 
tween sessions . . . should not be permitted. "I6 New Jersey remained the 
only state which prohibited in-court sketching until 1971 when the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court framed a similar rule.17 Apparently 
neither state, however, banned the sketching of courtroom scenes from 
memory. 
In 1974 the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) successfully peti- 
tioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for a modification of its sketching 
rule. In a reported decision,lB the New Jersey Supreme Court decided 
as a matter of policy that the ban on sketching should be removed. Coin- 
cidentally with the granting of the NBC petition, the court adopted the 
new Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association, noting 
that the Code "contains no prohibition against sketching judicial pro- 
ceedings in a courtroom, in the manner described."lg Rhode Island re- 
mains the only state that prohibits in-court sketching. 
Judicial limitations on sketching in the federal courts have had a more 
varied history. Among the flurry of studies, reports, and monographs on 
fornia Aberrution, 45 S. CAL. L. h v .  51 (1972). However, court-imposed prohibitions on 
publication of such information once divulged have been relatively rare though certainly not 
nonexistent. See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972). 
14Brief for Applicant at 2-3, Application of National Broadcasting Co., 64 N. J. 476, 317 A.2d 
695 (1974). 
Hereafter in the text, sketching done in the courtroom will be referred to as in-court sketch- 
ing. Sketching of courtroom scenes done from memory at locations other than the court- 
room or its environs will be referred to, at times, as sketching from memory. 
l5Zd. at 2-3. 
161d. at 3. 
''109 R.I. 968 (1971). The pertinent paragraph, 7 30, Provisional Order No. 9, CANONS OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, reads: 
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting conduct and decorum. The 
taking of photographs or sketching in the court room and the broadcasting or televising 
of court proceedings detract from the essential dignity of the court and should not be 
permitted. 
T h e  restriction shall not apply to substantially ceremonial proceedings, such as pro- 
ceedings involving admission of applicants to the bar or admission of applicants for 
naturalization. 
As of January 20, 1975, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was not considering either modify- 
ing or deleting the in-court sketching ban. Also as of that date, no petition for modification 
of or attack on the ban had been commenced by interested parties. Letter from Walter J. 
Kane, Head Clerk, Rhode Island Supreme Court, to Brigham Young University Law Review, 
January 20, 1975. 
18Application of National Broadcasting Co., 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d 695 (1974). 
l91d. at 478,317 A.2d at 697. 
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fair trial and free press appearing in the wake of the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Sheppard v .  Maxwell,2o only one made any 
reference to or suggestion concerning in-court sketching. The Kaufman 
Report, a report prepared by a committee of the Federal Judicial Confer- 
ence, contained suggestions for special orders applicable to "widely pub- 
licized and sensational cases."21 Such cases were defined in the report 
as those "likely to receive massive publicity and where the court's stand- 
ing rules and orders might be inadequate to eliminate prejudicial influ- 
ences from the courtroom."22 One of those special orders provides that 
the court may direct "that the names and addresses of jurors or prospec- 
tive jurors not be publicly released except as required by statute, and 
that no photograph be taken or sketch made of any juror within the 
environs of the court."23 TO date three federal district courts have 
adopted, for use only in "widely publicized and sensational cases," the 
narrowly drawn "special order" suggestions of the Kaufman Report.24 
Other than the ban promulgated by the Utah federal district court, 
there is only one instance of a federal judge imposing a blanket ban on 
the sketching of courtroom scenes wherever made and on the publication 
of such sketches. In the summer of 1973, the federal government began 
the criminal prosecution of certain members of the Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War, individuals popularly known as the "Gainesville Eight," 
who were accused of conspiring to disrupt the 1972 Republican National 
Convention. During pretrial proceedings, the trial judge announced 
orally from the bench a ban on in-court sketching during the course of the 
Gainesville Eight trial. When the judge became aware later that certain 
artists were sketching courtroom scenes from memory at locations outside 
the courtroom, he amended his order to state "that no sketches for publi- 
cation of proceedings in the courtroom or its environs were to be made, 
even though such sketches were made not in the courtroom or its 
environs but from memory . . . . " Soon after this order was promulgated, 
which was applicable only to the rather notorious Gainesville Eight trial, 
the trial judge issued a written general order imposing a blanket ban on 
sketches, regardless of where made, of scenes from the judge's courtroom 
and on publication of the same; the ban extended to all proceedings then 
pending or thereafter to be brought before the judge.25 
Appeals were taken from the court's orders and from contempt con- 
20384 U.S. 333 (1966). See note 13 supra. 
21Kaufman Report, supra note 3, at 45 F.R.D. 409. 
221d. 
231d. at 45 F.R.D. 410-1 1 .  
24S.D. Ind., Rule 29(5); D. Minn., Rule 7(c)(5); and W.D. Okla., Rule 26(m)(5). See note 
29 infru. 
25Facts are taken from statement of facts in the appellate court's decision. United States v. 
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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victions arising out of violations of the sketching and publication ban.26 
A unanimous Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of United States 
v .  Columbia Broadcusting System2? held that the orders were unconstitu- 
tionally overbroad and accordingly directed that they be vacated.28 
It appears, then, that as of the present time only in the state courts of 
Rhode Island and in Utah's federal courts is in-court sketching pro- 
hibited. Only Utah 's federal courts prohi bit sketches of courtroom 
scenes made from mem0ry.~9 
The Utah federal court's sketching ban is analytically divisible into 
two parts: (1) the prohibition on in-court sketching and (2) the prohibi- 
tion on the making and publication of drawings of courtroom scenes re- 
gardless of where made.3O This article will examine the latter aspect of 
261d. (appeal from the orders); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 107 
(5th Cir. 1974) (appeal from conviction of criminal contempt); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. 
v. Arnow, 497 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1974) (petition for mandamus dismissed as moot); National 
Broadcasting Co. v. Arnow, 497 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1974) (petition for mandamus dismissed as 
moot). 
27497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974). 
28The conviction of criminal contempt was reversed on a finding that the district judge 
should have disqualified himself. United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 107 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
29The survey of federal district court rules was made using H. FISCHER 8C J. WILLS, FEDERAL 
LOCAL COURT RULES (1975 repl.). Not all federal district courts have local rules in effect. The 
district court of Utah is among that group. Id. at xiii. Whenever a district court promul- 
gates local rules or amendments thereto, the court is directed to furnish copies of those rules 
and amendments to the United States Supreme Court. FED. R. CIV. P. 83. Apparently, neither 
the 1969 general order prohibiting in-court sketching nor the 1973 amendment thereto of 
Utah's federal district court was sent to the Supreme Court as required by rule 83 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
For the information on state court practices, reliance was placed on a survey found in Brief 
for Applicant at 14-15, Application of National Broadcasting Co., 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d 695 
(1974). 
S0It may be argued that the court intended to prohibit only the making of sketches from 
memory and not the publication of the same. The  difficulty in interpretation arises because 
the amended general order is ambiguous. It reads: 
The broadcasting or reporting for broadcasting by the radio, television, or other means, 
including the newspapers, whether done in the courtroom or its environs, in connection 
with any judicial proceeding, is hereby prohibited, whether court is actually in session 
or not - and emphasize- whether the cartoons, artists' drawings, caricatures, or what- 
ever they may be called, are made on these premises or  elsewhere. 
Transcript of Proceedings at 38-39, I n  re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, pro- 
ceedings of Feb. 2,1973). 
But there is rather clear evidence that the court's prohibition is meant to include publica- 
tion of sketches of courtroom scenes. The 1973 show cause order, see text accompanying 
note 4 supra, was directed to KCPX Television Station; Harold Woolley, the vice president 
and general manager of the station; Art Kent, the news director; and Allan Moll, Linda Ormes, 
and Sandy Gilmour, all news reporters of the station. The artist of the offending sketches, 
a Mr. Eduard Brijs, was not even named in the show cause order though he did appear as a 
witness a t  the hearing. Id. at 8-14. 
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the court's order in the context of three constitutional doctrines or 
principles: prior restraint on expression, public trials, and overbreadth. 
The three arguments advanced in support of the sketching ban - pro- 
tection of privacy, protection of reputational interests, and elimination 
of a chilling effect on the right to litigate - will also be examined. Final- 
ly, the article will analyze the more narrow aspect of the court's order - 
the ban on in-court sketching. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the sketching ban, however, it 
should be noted what issues and principles of law are not raised by the 
prohibition. First, it may be thought that the ban is merely an extension 
of general principles articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in 
Estes v .  Texm,3l where photography and especially television were 
banned from the courtroom on due process grounds. Such is not the case. 
Estes banned television and photography from the courtroom because 
(1) they were deemed disruptive and (2) they were deemed to have a 
subtle and adverse pyschological impact on jurors, witnesses, and other 
trial participants. These considerations are irrelevant to an analysis of 
sketching of courtroom scenes done outside of the courtroom. These 
same considerations appear to have a minimal relevancy to sketching 
done in court because drawing is generally as unobtrusive as taking writ- 
ten notes and can be carried on without the awareness of trial partici- 
pants. In short, the principles and policies examined in Estes are only 
indirectly, if at all, of importance in a discussion of the Utah sketching 
ban. 
Second, the sketching ban is not an attempt at resolution of a fair trial- 
free press conflict. That may appear as a surprising assertion, but it be- 
comes evident as one understands what the courts mean by a fair trial in 
a society that guarantees a free press. The Supreme Court confronted 
the fair trial-free press conflict in Sheppard v.  Ma~well ,3~ where the 
Court found that massive and adverse publicity attendant upon a crimi- 
nal trial can so taint the proceeding that the accused is denied due process, 
to wit, a fair trial conducted before unbiased and unprejudiced jurors. 
The Court, which earlier in Estes had looked at the prejudice resulting 
from news-gathering activities, in Sheppard focused on the content of 
news reports. The particular concern was that the content might bias 
potential and empaneled jurors. The Court firmly directed that trial 
judges take certain steps to control publicity before and during trials in 
those criminal cases in which publicity might jeopardize an accused's 
Further, it is mere sophistry to argue that a prohibition on the making of a sketch is not 
constitutionally offensive because such a prohibition does not extend to publication. Since 
the making of a sketch constitutes a component part of the publication process, to prohibit 
the making of a sketch is to prevent publication. An order need not use the word publication 
to constitute in fact a prohibition of that activity. 
3l38 1 U.S. 532 (1965). See note 13 supra. 
s2384 U.S. 333 (1966). See note 13 supra. 
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chances for a fair trial. The conflict between fair trial and free press, 
therefore, as that conflict is normally viewed, arises when a court seeks to 
preserve an unbiased panel of jurors during a criminal proceeding by 
restricting, in any of a variety of ways, media coverage of any stage of a 
criminal prosecution.33 
However, the goal of the Utah sketching ban apparently is not to 
ensure an unbiased panel of jurors for criminal trials. The court did 
not advance such as a goal of the sketching ban at the time the ban was 
promulgated. Indeed, if the court were attempting to protect potential 
or empaneled jurors from prejudicial publicity, arguably the prohibi- 
tion would have included other means of publicity, such as written re- 
ports in newspapers and verbal accounts on television. It is rather clear 
that the ban was promulgated not to ensure fair criminal trials but to 
protect privacy, reputational interests, and the right to litigate.34 The 
court said as much at the time it imposed the ban. The Utah federal 
court viewed sketching, apparently, as uniquely harmful to those latter 
interests and thus singled out the sketching medium for prohibition. 
For these reasons the sketching ban must be viewed as only tangentially, 
if at all, concerned with implementing the fair trial-free press guide- 
lines of Sheppard v .  
Such, then, are the issues the sketching ban does not raise. Turning to 
the issues raised, the first is the operation of the sketching ban as a prior 
restraint. 
A.  The Sketching Ban as a Prior Restraint on E x ~ r e s s i o n ~ ~  
Speaking generally, any official restriction that operates directly to 
prevent or prohibit expression in advance of publication is a prior re- 
straint. Prior restraint is thus distinguished from subsequent punish- 
ment which is a penalty imposed on the publisher after publication for 
having made the communication. Such a penalty may certainly induce 
self-censorship because of the publisher's desire to avoid the threatened 
sanction, and the chilling effect of the threatened and subsequent penalty 
can itself constitute grounds for constitutional attack. But under a sys- 
tem of subsequent punishment no official action is taken to stop com- 
33See, e.g., Kaufman Report, supra note 3; Reardon Report, supra note 13; Medina Report, 
supra note 13. 
W e e  notes 66-67 and accompanying text infra. 
35384 U.S. 333 (1 966). 
36The Supreme Court first invoked the doctrine of prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697 (1931), and has since employed the doctrine on numerous occasions. See, e.g., New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 
58 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
The classic analysis of the prior restraint doctrine continues to be Emerson, The Doctrine 
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955). A more current treatment of the 
doctrine is found in Note, Prior Restraint and the Press Following the Pentagon Papers Cases - 
Is the Immunity Dissolving?, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927 (1972). 
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munication before the event, whereas a system of prior restraint, if suc- 
cessfully implemented, prevents the expression from being made at a11.37 
Though it has followed the prior restraint-subsequent punishment 
distinction,38 the Supreme Court has never given a narrow, limiting defi- 
nition to the concept of prior restraint.39 However, the recent Pentagon 
Papers cases40 offer a classic example of the operation of the doctrine. 
After the New York T imes  and other newspapers began publication of 
certain materials, the Government acted to prevent further publication. 
The Supreme Court declared that the order secured by the Government 
enjoining publication constituted a prior restraint, which, under all of 
the facts of the case, was constitutionally impermissible. 
37As stated in Emerson, supra note 36, at 648: 
The concept of prior restraint, roughly speaking, deals with official restrictions im- 
posed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication. Prior 
restraint is thus distinguished from subsequent punishment, which is a penalty imposed 
after the communication has been made as a punishment for having made it. Again 
speaking generally, a system of prior restraint would prevent communication from oc- 
curring at all; a system of subsequent punishment allows the communication but imposes a 
penalty after the event. Of course, the deterrent effect of a later penalty may operate to 
prevent a communication from ever being made. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, 
the impact upon freedom of expression may be quite different, depending upon whether 
the system of control is designed to block publication in advance or deter it by subsequent 
punishment. 
In constitutional terms, the doctrine of prior restraint holds that the First Amendment 
forbids the Federal Government to impose any system of prior restraint, with certain 
limited exceptions, in any area of expression that is within the boundaries of that Amend- 
ment. By incorporating the First Amendment in the Fourteenth Amendment, the same 
limitations are applicable to the states. 
38Though the prior restraint -subsequent punishment distinction has been criticized, 
Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. h v .  533, 544 (1951); Note, Prior 
Restraint - A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases, 49 G L U M .  L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1949), 
it is dear that the Court in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), considered the distinction 
crucial. In fact, the four dissenters stated that the "Minnesota statute does not operate as a 
previous restraint on publication within the proper meaning of that phrase." Id. at 735 (em- 
phasis in original). 
The prior restraint - subsequent punishment distinction is often traced to a famous passage 
by Blackstone: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in 
laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for 
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what 
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the 
press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the 
consequence of his own temerity. 
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 15 1-52. 
39Speaking for a unanimous Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241,256 (1974), Chief Justice Burger said: 
The Florida [right to reply] statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute 
or regulation forbidding appellant from publishing specified matter. Governmental 
restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject 
to constitutional limitations on governmental powers. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 
297 U.S. 233,244-45 (1936). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
40New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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When, in the Pentagon Papers cases, the Supreme Court struck down 
the Government's injunction, it was merely attaching well-established 
legal consequences to a finding of prior restraint. With certain limited 
exceptions, any governmental system of prior restraint is prohibi ted.4l 
Or, in the words of the Court, a prior restraint on expression carries a 
"heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."42 The weight 
of that presumption is demonstrated by the paucity of cases sustaining an 
activity operating as a prior re~traint.~3 
A judge can impose a constitutionally valid prior restraint only in ex- 
ceptional and extremely limited circumstances. 
[B] efore a prior restraint may be imposed by a judge, even in the interest 
41Emerson, supra note 36, at 648. 
42Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See New York Times v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 814 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 
419 (1971). 
431n Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931), Chief Justice Hughes indicated that 
there are certain exceptions to the absolute prohibition against prior restraints: 
The  objective has also been made that the principle as to immunity from previous 
restraint is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is 
undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. 
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases: "When a nation is at war 
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that 
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard 
them as protected by any constitutional right." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52. 
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its 
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and 
location of troops. On  similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be en- 
forced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protested 
against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. 
T h e  constitutional guaranty of free speech does not "protect a man from an injunction 
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gornpers v. Buck Stove 6. 
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439." Schenck v.  United States, supra. These limitations are not 
applicable here. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
In  shorthand form, the exceptions are national security, obscenity, and fighting words. 
Only the obscenity exception has been invoked with any degree of success, see, e.g., Kingsley 
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), but even in the obscenity area a prior restraint must 
overcome a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58 (1963) (striking down a system of prior administrative restraints on obscenity). 
T h e  Government has met marked failure in its efforts to invoke the national security ex- 
ception. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971), where Justice 
Brennan stated in his concurring opinion: 
Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, 
and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a 
transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. 
See also Note, The National Security Exception to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 13 W M .  8t 
MARY L. &v. 214 (1971). 
Fighting words are almost exclusively dealt with by subsequent punishment rather than by 
prior restraint. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 314 U.S. 568 (1942). 
Other possible exceptions to the prohibition of prior restraints, dubbed "ministerial re- 
straints" and "news management," are discussed in Note, Prior Restraint and the Press Fol- 
lowing the Pentagon Papers Cases - Is the Immunity Dissolving?, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927, 
944-48 (1972). 
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of assuring a fair trial, there must be "an imminent, not merely a likely, 
threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote 
or even probable; it must immediately imperil."44 
Thus, when a judge, in the absence of immediately imperiling circum- 
stances, prohibits a reporter from communicating what he witnesses in 
court, the prohibition constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on 
communication. To  give an example, a federal district court judge 
sitting in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, ordered that "no report of the testi- 
mony taken in this case today shall be made in any newspaper or by radio 
or television, or by another news media." Two reporters violated the 
order by publishing an account of what they had witnessed in court. The 
result was a contempt conviction and an appeal therefrom. A unanimous 
Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals, in the case of United States v .  Dick in~on /~  
struck down the order as an impermissible prior restraint. Chief Judge 
John R. Brown, speaking for the court, said: 
The initial question with which we are confronted concerns the con- 
stitutionality of the District Court's order. Sympathetic as we are to the 
legitimate objective earnestly pursued by the conscientious Trial Judge 
(preservation of an impartial venire within the local community when- 
ever the state criminal prosecution should reach trial), we must conclude 
that a blanket ban on publication of Court proceedings so far trans- 
gresses First Amendment freedoms that any such absolute proscription 
"cannot withstand the mildest breeze emanating from the Constitu- 
tion."46 
In constitutional contemplation there is no difference between a 
journalist writing down what he has previously observed in court and 
a journalist-artist drawing the same.47 The Utah federal court's ban on 
sketching courtroom scenes from memory is in substance the same type 
of prior restraint struck down by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Dickinson. The order there and the Utah order were framed to prevent 
expression, to prohibit before the fact the making of a communication. 
-- - 
44United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting 
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,376 (1947)). 
45465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972). 
46Zd. at 500 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 
1016, 1017 (5th Cir. (1972)). 
471f there is an intent to communicate and an element of communicativeness present in the 
conduct, such will be treated in constitutional adjudication as expression or "speech" within 
the meaning of the first amendment. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. 
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Spence v. Washington, supra, for example, 
a student hung an American flag, upside down with a peace sign attached thereto, out of his 
window. The Court concluded that such was protected expression because " [a] n intent to 
convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likeli- 
hood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id. 410-1 1. 
A sketching of a courtroom scene by an artist-journalist intended for publication is like- 
wise within the meaning of "expression" and as such is entitled to constitutional protection. 
The contrary cannot seriously be argued. 
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The Utah order in particular was not framed to counter an imminent 
and immediately imperiling danger to the administration of justice. The 
sketching ban, as a prior restraint on expression, cannot, therefore, "with- 
stand the mildest breeze emanating from the Constitution." 
B. The  Sketching Ban and the Guarantees of Public Trial 
Not only does the broad sketching ban constitute unconstitutional 
censorship, it operates in derogation of the constitutional mandate that 
what transpires in the courtroom shall be That guarantee of 
public trial is embodied in part in the sixth amendment, which deals with 
criminal proceedings.49 Arguably, it is also an integral part of fifth and 
48The Supreme Court in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) declared: 
A trial is a public event. What  transpires in the court room is public property . . . . Those 
who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity. There is no special per- 
quisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of 
democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in pro- 
ceedings before it. 
Id. (emphasis added). Only several months later, the Court in In  re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 
266-7 1 (1948), articulated the meaning of a public trail in the American tradition. 
This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots 
in our English common law heritage. The exact date of its origin is obscure, but it likely 
evolved long before the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institu- 
tion of jury trial. In this country the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial 
first appeared in a state constitution in 1776. Following the ratification in 1791 of the 
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, which commands that "In all criminal prosecu- 
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . ." most of the origi- 
nal states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted similar constitutional 
provisions. Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial 
decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public. 
The  traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed 
to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the 
English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de 
cachet. All of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to liberty. In  the hands 
of despotic groups each of them had become an instrument for the suppression of 
political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair 
trial. Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in 
public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safe- 
guard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The 
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum 
of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. One need 
not wholly agree with a statement made on the subject by Jeremy Bentham over 120 years 
ago to appreciate the fear of secret trials felt by him, his predecessors and contemporaries. 
Bentham said: ". . . suppose the proceedings to be completely secret, and the court, on 
the occasion, to consist of no more than a single judge, - that judge will be at once in- 
dolent and arbitrary: how corrupt soever his inclination may be, it will find no check, 
at any rate no tolerably efficient check, to oppose it. Without publicity, all other checks 
are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recor- 
dation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character 
of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as 
checks only in appearance." 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
49The sixth amentment states, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process and thus a require- 
ment of civil trials.50 Substantial authority indicates that the guarantee 
of public trials belongs not only to the accused and other parties to an 
action but to the public as ~ e l l . 5 ~  Numerous actions to ensure a public 
trial have been commenced and successfully prosecuted by the media 
where the media was asserting not jus tertii rights and claims, that is, 
those of the accused, but rather the right of the media to report on court- 
room proceedings and the right of the public to know of the same.52 In 
fact, society's interest in public trials will prevail over the accused's re- 
quest for a secret, private proceeding.53 
Over the years, courts have articulated the policies underlying the tra- 
dition and mandate of public trials. First, public trials operate as a re- 
S0The assertion that public civil trials are guaranteed by due process provisions has two 
underpinnings: policy and tradition. Civil trials have traditionally been open to the public 
and to representatives of the media. The pleadings and transcripts are of public record. 
A closed civil proceeding is probably more rare in the American justice system than a closed 
criminal proceeding since a large number of "criminal" cases involve juvenile defendants and 
are thus, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the jurisdiction, closed to the public. 
The  policies advanced in support of public trials often arise out of a criminal trial context, 
but they apply with equal cogency to civil proceedings. For a discussion of these policies see 
notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra. 
51As the court stated in United States ex. rel. Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199, 204 
(D.N.J. 1971): 
If a public trial was not accorded to the petitioner, the Due Process clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment was violated. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 
(1948). Public trial is essentially a right of the accused. Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 
(9 Cir. 1959). There is, however, a correlative right to presewe the public's right to be in- 
formed about criminal prosecutions in the best interests of all citizens. Lewis v. Peyton, 
352 F.2d 791 (4 Cir. 1965); United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3 Cir. 1949). 
Id. (emphasis added). But see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,588 (Harlan, J., concurring): 
Thus the right of "public trial" is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging 
to the accused, and inherent in the institutional process by which justice is administered. 
But Justice Harlan, in the same concurring opinion, stated: 
Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a newsgathering agency may publicize, with- 
in wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the courtroom. 
Id. at 589. 
52See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557,490 P.2d 563 (1971); Phoenix 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); Johnson v. Simpson, 
433 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968); E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 
(1955); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171,282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972). 
53See Cox v. State, 3 Md. App. 136, 137, 238 A.2d 157, 158 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968), where the 
court said: 
The Appellant next contends that the trial judge improperly denied his request for a 
private trial. He contends that the right to a public trial is a right belonging solely to the 
accused and that the accused may, therefore, waive this right if he so desires. 
I t  is true that the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees to an 
accused "the right to a speedy and public trial." But we do not read this guarantee as 
carrying with it a right in the accused to demand a private trial. Under our form of 
government, secrecy in any phase of its administration is abhorrent; secrecy in the adminis- 
tration of justice is intolerable. Our citizens have the same interest in insuring that fair 
play is accorded an accused at trial as they do in seeing that the rights of society are pre- 
served and respected in the trial of an alleged offender against its laws. 
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straint on arbitrariness and other abuses of judicial power.S4 Second, an 
open forum encourages veracity in the witne~ses.~5 Third, a notified 
public may be able to come forth with additional and necessary evi- 
dence.56 Finally, and perhaps most important, public trials serve as an 
educational tool that operates to instill, in the public, confidence in the 
nation's system of justice.57 
Since sketching serves, under present strictures, as the only means of 
visual communication of courtroom activities,58 a court, by eliminating 
sketching, makes trials less public and less open. Those who receive in- 
formation solely from nonvisual media are less well informed than they 
could be were drawings and sketches available. Many rely on television 
as one source, or even an exclusive source of news;59 but, as noted above, 
54See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 
419 F.2d 599,606 (3d Cir. 1969). 
55As Blackstone said: 
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much 
more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private and secret examination 
taken down in writing before an officer or his clerk in the ecclesiastical courts, and all 
others that have borrowed their practice from the civil law; where a witness may fre- 
quently depose that, in private, which he will be ashamed to testiQ in a public and solemn 
tribunal. 
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373. See United States v. American Radiator & Std. Sani- 
tary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790,794 (W.D. Pa. 1967). 
56See Reardon Report, supra note 13, at 50: "Finally, as in the case of reports of arrests and 
requests for evidence, reporting of the trial may evoke evidence that will aid in convicting or 
exonerating the accused." 
S7See, e.g., United States v. American Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp. 274 F. Supp. 790, 794 
(W.D. Pa. 1967), where the court said a public trial "has an educative effect which can in- 
crease respect for law and provide confidence in judicial remedies." 
Most of the various policies underlying public trials were summed up in State v. Haskins, 
38 N.J. Super. 250,252, 118 A.2d 707,709 (App. Div. 1955): 
[A] public trial serves as a very salutary restraint upon gross abuses of the judicial power, 
upon lesser evils, such as indolence or a petty arbitrariness on the part of the judge and- 
by exposing witnesses to the eyes and the ears of the public-upon any tendency to- 
ward mendacity on their part. There are incidental virtues. By adding a certain for- 
mality and solemnity to the trial, it brings to lawyers, and to the jury also, a sense of their 
responsibility; and by enabling the community to know what the courts are doing, it 
gives a community confidence in its courts. 
58See note 13 supra. 




Both newspapers and television (with or without other media) 26% 
Newspapers and other media but not television 10% 
Television and other media but not newspapers 6% 
Media other than television or newspapers 17% 
In  1972, the survey was repeated with the following results: 
Television 3370 
Newspapers 19% 
Both newspapers and television (with or without other media) 26% 
Newspapers and other media but not television 5 70 
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the effectiveness of television to report the news is dependent on its 
ability to use sketches and other visual media.60 
Certainly there are departures from the mandate of completely 
public trials,e1 but all such departures, including the sketching ban, are 
sustainable only if they meet a standard of "strict and inescapable neces- 
sity."62 There has never been a showing that the Utah federal court's 
sketching ban is necessary, let alone inescapably necessary, to accomplish 
an articulated and permissible goal. 
C.  The  Sketching Ban and the Requirement of Narrowly Drawn 
Restrictions 
Overbreadth is the third infirmity of constitutional proportions in- 
herent in the sketching prohibition. The ban extends to civil as well as 
to criminal proceedings, to mundane, nonsensational proceedings as well 
as to notorious, highly publicized events, to nonjury as well as to jury 
trials, to fair as well as to unfair portrayals, to sketches made in the news- 
room as well as to sketches made in the courtroom. Seemingly the ban 
was promulgated without heed to the principle that "constitutional stan- 
dards restrict the methods by which a court . . . can limit the press to the 
narrowest rules or orders which will accomplish the desired Or, 
in the Supreme Court's articulation of the overbreadth doctrine: 
[El ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, 
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental 
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The 
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less 
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.64 
Yet in attempting to measure the sketching ban against the require- 
ment of "narrowness" or "less drastic means," one is confronted with the 
difficulty of identifying the goals or objectives sought to be achieved by 
Television and other media but not newspapers 5% 
Media other than television or newspapers 12% 
THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, INC., WHAT PEOPLE THINK OF TELEVISION AND OTHER  ASS MEDIA 
1959-1972, at 2-3 (1973). 
6oSee note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
GIThe public may be excluded from the courtroom in order to preserve order, United States 
ex rel. Orlando v. Ray, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); United 
States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); to insure the safety of witnesses and parties, 
United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957 
(1970); and to protect the morals of the public, United States v. Kobli, supra. 
62See United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 607 (3d Cir. 1969), where the 
court said: 
It has always been recognized that any claim of practical justification for a departure 
from the constitutional requirement of a public trial must be tested by a stan- 
dard of strict and inescapable necessity. 
63Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558,561 -62 (7th Cir. 1970). 
64Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960). 
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the prohibition. The court seems not to have been motivated by standard 
concerns such as disruption and distraction in the courtroom, prejudicial 
publicity affecting an accused's right to fair trial, or a distortion of the 
response of jurors, witnesses, and other participants caused by an aware- 
ness of the gaze of others (even beyond those present in court) upon 
them.65 Rather, the court, in promulgating its prohibition, seems to 
have been motivated by a concern for reputational interests, privacy, 
and a potential litigant's right of access to the courts. 
The court's reasons for the amendment to and extension of the sketch- 
ing ban, taken from the transcript of the 1973 proceeding at which the 
amendment was promulgated, are reproduced in complete, verbatim 
form in the appendix to this article. By way of summary, however, the 
court asserted that litigants and accused have a right to participate in 
judicial proceedings without being exposed to the glare of publicity. 
Particularly, such trial participants have a right not to be degraded by 
grotesque representations of their physical characteristics which subject 
the participant to ridicule and ~onternpt.~6 The existence of such un- 
complimentary exposure and publicity, or even the threat thereof, has 
a chilling effect on the exercise of one's right to seek justice in the judicial 
forum. Rather than face the exposure of uncomplimentary publicity, 
potential litigants forego litigation which would otherwise be available 
for the vindication of their rights.67 
65See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text. 
66Transcript of proceedings 33-34, In re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, pro- 
ceedings of Feb. 2, 1973). 
Now, the purpose of this order was at the time it was entered, and still is, to protect 
people who have business with the federal court and are compelled, if they want to do 
business, to come here. 
. . . . 
The Constitution of the United States of America gives the citizens and other people in 
the country the right to a trial, a common law trial, the kind of trial that the founders 
knew about in their time. And by that I mean this: Folks have the right to come here 
and do their business with the court without being pilloried. They have the right to 
come here and do business with the court and not be subjected to ridicule, hatred, con- 
tempt, and they have the right to come here and do business with this court without being 
held up to degradation by grotesque representations of their physical characteristics. 
. . .We are concerned with people, human beings, who have a constitutional right, 
when they are compelled to come here to do business, to be free from being made a public 
display of. 
67Id. at 37-38. 
I t  is a tragedy to have to come to court. It is a disaster to have to come to court. Folks 
do not come here because they want to. They come here because they have to. And they 
have a constitutional right not to be photographed in here, not to be drawn in grotesque 
shapes and forms and colors and displayed to the community. There is a very, very wrong 
influence in that sort of stuff, and that influence is that some people would rather forego 
coming to court and seeking justice, having their rights vindicated, than to be subjected 
to notoriety, ridicule, being pilloried in the market place, and so cold chills run up their 
spines. They say, "Oh, let's forget it. Let's forget it." 
That is a serious, chilling effect upon the need and the desire and the opportunity to 
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Laudatory as these concerns for reputational interests, privacy, and 
right of access to the courts may be, they cannot sustain the sketching ban 
against constitutional attack. 
The court attempted to protect reputational interests by suppressing 
, all communications of courtroom scenes conveyed by one medium, 
sketching. The basis of the suppression, apparently, was the fear or be- 
lief that sketching would be used to defame. Indeed, the court, in impos- 
ing the blanket sketching ban, seemed to proceed on the premise that 
not only some but all sketches represent people in grotesque shapes and 
in a defamatory style. That premise is not true in fact. Sketching is no 
more inherently defamatory than the written word. Yet the court banned 
all sketches because some hold the subject up to "ridicule, hatred, [and] 
contempt." Such a ban is no more constitutionally sound and per- 
missible than a ban imposed on all books because some books are obscene. 
If, however, a sketch is in fact injurious to the subject's reputation, the 
injured reputational interests may be vindicated and the rights of a free 
press thus curtailed, but only if the evidentiary standards for libel cases 
enunciated in Gertz u. Robert Welch, Inc.,68 Curtis Publishing Co. v .  
B ~ t t s , 6 ~  and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan70 are met. Under the doc- 
trine of the latter two cases, a public official or public figure can success- 
fully prosecute a defamation action only on proof that the reporting was 
done with knowledge of the report's falsity or with reckless disregard for 
the truth of the publication. Under Gertz, a private individual can hold 
the press liable for a libelous report only by proving that the defendant's 
conduct in publishing the report amounted at least to negligence. If 
such is proven, the plaintiff may then recover a money judgment only for 
actual injuries, the existence of which are proven by competent evi- 
dence.T1 These principles and evidentiary standards are aimed at pre- 
venting a concern for reputational interests, manifested in libel and 
slander actions, from unduly restricting or infringing upon the pre- 
eminent interest in free expression. It  can thus be correctly asserted that 
governmental systems designed to protect or vindicate reputational in- 
terests, because of their necessary chilling effect on the exercise of free 
expression, must be very narrow and limited indeed. 
The Utah court, however, in promulgating the sketching ban, dis- 
regarded the constitutional principles of New York Times and subse- 
quent cases. The sketching ban, arguably an attempt to balance reputa- 
tional interests against free expression guarantees, operates to make repu- 
appear in court and have their cases heard. 
68418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
69388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
70376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
"See Note, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41,139-48 (1974) for a general 
discussion of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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tational interests not merely preeminent but absolute. The court's ban 
does not merely prohibit the defamatory sketch, it absolutely prohibits 
all sketches of courtroom scenes. 
Neither can a system designed to protect privacy interests be sufficient- 
ly broad, within current constitutional strictures, to validate the court's 
sketching prohibition. While there is undoubtedly a right to privacy of 
constitutional dimensions,72 the right does have outer boundaries which 
simply do not reach far enough to sustain the sketching ban. First, one 
cannot demand in a public forum the same degree of privacy and free- 
dom from exposure that one can rightfully claim in the confines of the 
home. In other words, substantive privacy stops where the public forum 
begins.73 And though in some contexts there may be a dispute as to what 
constitutes a public forum or to what degree of publicity the forum is 
susceptible, there is no doubt that the courtroom, in all its normal uses, 
is a public forum. The Supreme Court declared in Craig u. H a r n e ~ ~ ~  
that: 
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public 
property. . . . Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with 
impunity. There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables 
it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to 
suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it. 
Secondly, when the right to privacy clashes with freedom of the press, 
particularly the right of the media to report newsworthy happenings, free 
press prevails. Only if the news reporting is done with actual malice, that 
is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, may the right 
to privacy be vindicated and the rights of a free press curtailed. Such is 
the holding and measure of Time, Inc. u. Hi11,75 where the Court said: 
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of 
life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential 
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom 
of speech and of press. 76 
72See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
73Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) with Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 
U.S. 728 (1970). 
T h e  Court has said on occasion that the fourth amendment right of privacy protects people, 
not places, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347, 351 (1967), but "[allthough the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly denied that the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of 
places rather than people, it has yet to produce a Fourth Amendment holding which does not 
depend on the nature of the place where the unreasonable search or seizure took place." Note, 
Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L. J. 1462, 1457 (1973). 
I t  should be noted that the broad right to privacy discussed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965), and based on elements of the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth 
amendments, was used in that case to vindicate the privacy of a very private place- the 
marital bedroom. 
7*331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). 
75385 U.S. 374 (1965). 
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There is no right of privacy, constitutional or otherwise, sufficiently 
broad in scope and potency to sustain the overly restrictive sketching ban 
of Utah's federal district court. 
The sketching ban is justified also, it is argued, because the threat 
of unfavorable publicity and exposure attendant upon litigation has a 
chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to litigate. The sketching 
ban, therefore, seeks to minimize that chilling effect by eliminating or 
greatly reducing publicity of courtroom events. This chilling-effect 
argument, certainly novel, contains fundamental difficulties. First, the 
argument is based on the unproven factual premise that people actually 
forego litigation rather than face the risk of public exposure. That 
factual premise may be true. The contrary is not asserted here, though 
the ever-increasing civil caseload of the courts would tend to indicate 
that the factual premise of the chilling argument is erroneous.77 And it 
can be noted that in the present situation, no litigant is alleging a chill- 
ing effect and requesting protection therefrom. Rather, the court, on an 
untested, unproven factual premise, offers protection against the sup- 
posed chill by promulgating an order that substantially infringes upon 
first amendment rights of free expression and fifth and sixth amendment 
rights of public trial. It seems not too much to ask that, before a substan- 
tial restriction on fundamental personal liberties is imposed, the factual 
basis of that restriction be demonstrated by some type of convincing em- 
pirical evidence. No such evidence has appeared to support the sketching 
ban. 
Even granting, however, that the court's factual premise is correct, 
there remain grave questions whether the sketching ban represents the 
proper balance between, on the one hand, the above described interests 
in free expression and public trial and, on the other, the right to litigate 
in the federal judicial forum. The long-standing American tradition of 
public trials, enshrined in part in the sixth amendment, militates against 
the sketching ban. Not only has the courtroom traditionally been an 
open forum (in a physical sense), but journalists have repeatedly been 
protected in their right to report on what they witness in c0urt.~8 And 
court records, often containing a verbatim account of courtroom pro- 
ceedings, are open to the public.79 Only in exceptional circumstances is 
76Zd. at 388. 
77111 1960, there were 51,062 civil (i.e., noncriminal, nonbankruptcy) cases filed in the 
federal district courts; in 1970, 82,665. P. BATOR, P. MISKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 51 (2d ed. 1973). 
78See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); United 
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972). 
791n Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 43 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S. March 3, 1975), the Supreme 
Court reviewed a Georgia statute forbidding the publication of the names of rape victims. 
The Court identified the issue and gave its holding in these words: 
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the courtroom a forum of limited exposure.80 
Further, a press entitled to report on judicial proceedings by effective 
means such as sketching confers a substantial benefit on society. A free 
press reports abuses of delegated judicial power, perversions of adversary 
processes, and concomitant miscarriages of justice. A public awareness 
of such evils will, if the evils are sufficiently grave and the awareness there- 
of sufficiently keen, lead to reform. Successful reform of the justice sys- 
tem, that is, reform that eradicates the evils exposed, preserves and en- 
hances the value of the right to litigate within that system.B1 Yet the Utah 
federal district court with its sketching ban seeks to preserve the right to 
litigate by curtailing those very institutions - public trial and free 
press - which have traditionally operated to make the right meaning- 
fill. 
D. Sketching in Court and the Judge's Discretion 
Much that has already been said herein concerning the courtroom as 
a public place, the right of the media to report courtroom happenings, 
[The issue is] whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the 
name of a rape victim obtained from public records- more specifically, from judicial 
records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which them- 
selves are open to public inspection. We are convinced that the State may not do so. 
Id. at 4350. 
The Cox Broadcasting case is also important for its treatment of the right of privacy-free 
press conflict. See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text. The appellee (a private citizen) 
claimed a right to be free from unwanted publicity (about his affairs) which would be offensive 
to a man of ordinary sensitivities. Id. at 4349. The Court, however, held that the appellee 
did not have a right to privacy sufficiently broad in scope to prevent the press from reporting 
fully the events of a judicial proceeding. 
Appellee has claimed in this litigation that the efforts of the press have infringed his 
right to privacy by broadcasting to the world the fact that his daughter was a rape victim. 
The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising 
from the prosecutions, however, are without question events of legitimate concern to the 
public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations 
of government. 
Id. at 4350 (emphasis added). 
80Hearings in juvenile courts are generally closed, i.e., the general public is excluded. See, 
e.g., NEV.  REV. STAT. 62.193(1) (1971). 
For other examples of instances where all or part of the public may be excluded from the 
courtroom, see note 61 supra. 
S1This principle was recently articulated by Mr. Justice White, speaking for an eight-man 
majority (Justice Rehnquist dissented on jurisdictional grounds) in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 43 U.S.L.W. 4343,4350 (US.  March 3,1975): 
In the first place, in a society in which each individual has but limited time and re- 
sources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies 
necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those opera- 
tions. . . . Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our 
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the ad- 
ministration of government generally. With respect to judicial proceedings in par- 
ticular, the function of the press sewes to guarantee the fairness of  trials and to bring to 
bear the beneficial effects of pu blic scrutiny upon the adminzstration ofjustice. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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and the danger of overbroad restrictions applies to the more narrow as- 
pect of the sketching ban - the prohibition on sketching i n  the court- 
room. However, an additional element is involved with the in-court 
sketching ban: the trial judge's broad discretion to control courtroom 
activity, or stated differently, the judge's power to maintain order.82 But 
a power to maintain order should not include the power to control that 
which is not disruptive or distracting where other legitimate interests 
are involved. There needs to be a limit or restraint on a trial court's 
order-keeping power to prevent that power from being arbitrarily and 
broadly exercised to satisfy a judge's personal whims. Therefore, before 
a trial judge can exercise his order-keeping power to prohibit an activity 
in the courtroom, there must be an actual showing that the activity is ob- 
trusive or disruptive. Such is the holding of Columbia  B r o a d ~ a s t i n g : ~  
where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a blanket ban on 
in-court sketching imposed by a federal district court. The court recog- 
nized the trial judge's broad discretion to control courtroom activity but 
concluded that without evidence that sketching is in some way obtrusive 
or disruptive, the sweeping prohibition of in-court sketching could not 
be condoned. The panel was unanimously and "firmly of the view that 
the restraint imposed by the court below is overly broad and thus 
invalid. "84 
Sketching is not inherently disruptive. The person who draws in the 
courtroom can do so, if he desires, with little more distraction to the par- 
ticipants than one who takes pencil notes. Orderly sketching in the court- 
room is, therefore, simply not an activity that can be controlled or regu- 
lated by a trial judge's order-keeping power. 
The Salt Lake City media have failed to take legal action to challenge 
the local rule prohibiting the drawing of courtroom scenes. Some media 
representatives have advanced as a reason for this inaction a reluctance to 
violate the order, undergo prosecution for contempt, and suffer a a imi-  
nal conviction all for the sole purpose of testing the validity of the rule 
in a higher court.g5 But a criminal contempt proceeding is not the only 
procedure available for challenging the constitutionality of the local 
rule. Television and newspaper representatives have available to them, 
g2See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(ordinarily the trial judge has extremely broad discretion to control courtroom activity). 
WJnited States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974). See notes 25- 
28 supra and accompanying text. 
84Zd. at 107. 
*51n United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), see text accompanying notes 
45-46 supra, the appellate court struck down the court order violated by the conternnors but 
held that, in the circumstances of the case, the order could not be disregarded with impunity. 
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as effective procedural alternatives with which to challenge the rule, 
either an action for declaratory judgment86 or a petition for an extra- 
Id. at 509. The court relied on the "well-established principle in proceedings for criminal 
contempt that an injunction duly issuing out of a court having. . . jurisdiction must be obeyed, 
irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order. Invalidity is no defense to criminal con- 
tempt." Id. (emphasis in original). See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
The case was remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether or not it would 
still consider the conduct contemptuous in view of the appellate court's decision that the 
order violated was unconstitutional. The district court, on remand, sustained the contempt 
conviction. United States v. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972). 
Testing the validity of a court order in a contempt proceeding is thus an extremely risky 
undertaking. 
86Both the legislative history of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. $5 2201-02 
(1970), and subsequent judicial treatment of the Act indicate that the declaratory judgment 
procedure may be properly invoked to challenge a local rule of court. 
From the legislative history of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, it is clear that Con- 
gress intended that interested parties who desired to test the validity or meaning of a statute 
carrying penalties not be forced to violate the statute and thus face the risks of testing con- 
stitutionality in a criminal prosecution. Congress intended the declaratory judgment action 
to serve as a less risky, less dangerous procedural alternative. The Senate committee report 
on the proposed Federal Declaratory Judgment Act stated: 
The [declaratory judgment] procedure [in the States] has been especially useful in 
avoiding the necessity, now so often present, of having to act at one's peril or to act on 
one's own interpretation of his rights, or abandon one's rights because of a fear of in- 
curring damages. So now it is often necessary, in the absence of the declaratory judgment 
procedure to violate or purport to violate a statute in order to obtain a judicial determina- 
tion of its meaning or validity. 
S. REP. NO. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1934). 
Professor Borchard, the great and long-time champion of a federal declaratory judgment 
act, submitted a written statement at the congressional hearing on the Act containing an 
explanation of one role of the declaratory judgment procedure: 
[TI he declaratory judgment serves another useful purpose. It often happens that courts 
are unwilling to grant injunctions to restrain the enforcement of penal statutes or or- 
dinances, and relegate the plaintiff to his option, either to violate the statute and take 
his chances in testing constitutionality on a criminal prosecution, or else to forego, in the 
fear of prosecution, the exercise of his claimed rights. Into this dilemma no civilized legal 
system operating under a constitution should force any person. The court, in effect, by 
refusing an injunction informs the prospective victim that the only way to determine 
whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool, is to eat it. Assuming that the plaintiff 
has a vital interest in the enforcement of the challenged statute or ordinance, there is 
no reason why a declaratory judgment should not be issued, instead of compelling a viola- 
tion of the statute as a condition precedent to challenging its constitutionality. 
Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subconz. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 
1st Sess. 75-76 (1928). 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have reemphasized that Congress intended, with the 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, to provide a means for testing the validity of statutes carry- 
ing criminal penalties. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 
401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 
241 (1967). 
Recent case law also supports the contention that the declaratory judgment procedure 
may be properly invoked to challenge a local rule of a federal district court. When Judge 
Richard Austin of Chicago promulgated a local rule prohibiting photography not only in the 
courtroom and its immediate environs but also in virtually the entire Federal Courthouse and 
Office Building, including the ground floors (19 floors from the nearest courtroom), the 
plaza (a site of frequent demonstrations), and the sidewalks surrounding the buildings, cer- 
tain news photographers brought a class action seeking a declaration that the rule was invalid 
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ordinary writ such as mandamus or prohibition.g7 Either alternative can 
be used without subjecting the media to the risks of a criminal prosecu- 
tion. 
Yet even in the absence of these procedural alternatives, it can serious- 
ly be contemplated whether the media are justified in acquiescing in an 
unconstitutional rule which infringes important first, fifth, and sixth 
amendment rights because of the possible criminal penalties violation of 
and an injunction against its enforcement. Both the United States Attorney and the United 
States Marshall for the district were named as defendants. The judge was not joined. After 
the district court dismissed the complaint, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously 
reversed. Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970). The appellate court held that * 
the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment to the effect that the local rule went 
beyond the scope of the first amendment and to an injunction prohibiting enforcement of 
those parts of the rule declared invalid. Id. at 561. 
*'The power to issue writs of mandamus or prohibition to a district court judge is conferred 
upon the federal circuit courts of appeal by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 5 1651 (1970). Con- 
cededly, the proper use or scope of that power is difficult to ascertain. But whatever may be 
the limitations upon the use of an extraordinary writ in other circumstances, it appears clear 
that a circuit court of appeals properly exercises its power under the All Writs Act when it 
issues a writ to nullify an unlawful or unconstitutional local rule of a district court. For 
example, when a district court promulgated a local rule limiting the pro hac vice appearance 
of out-of-state attorneys, certain of the affected attorneys filed petitions in the circuit court 
of appeals for writs of mandamus to determine the validity of the rule. Sanders v. Russell, 
401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968). The respondent district court judges asserted (1) that the court 
of appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for mandamus because the appellate 
court had no supervisory power to question rules promulgated by a district court; and (2) 
that mandamus was not the proper remedy. The circuit court of appeals responded that 
" [ t ]  hese arguments are patently without mer i t . .  . . [ T ]  here is no  doubt of our superuisory 
power by the grant of a writ of mandamus to prohibit the District Court from enforcing its 
rule." Id. at 244 (emphasis added). Proceeding to the substantive issue of whether enforce- 
ment of the local rule should be prohibited, the court found that the rule contravened what 
it termed the "congressional intent" or policy to facilitate proceedings in vindication of civil 
rights brought or sought to be brought in federal court. Though the local rule possibly con- 
tained infirmities of constitutional dimensions, the court did not reach those issues. On the 
more narrow basis that the rule contravened congressional intent, the court declared the 
local rule invalid and issued a writ of mandamus against its enforcement. Id. at 244-48. 
The declaration in Sanders v. Russell, supra, affirming the existence of a supervisory power 
in the circuit courts of appeal operative on the district courts though the extraordinary writs 
is well founded. See 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 110.28, at 305-06, 312-13 (2d ed. 1973) 
[hereinafter cited as ~ ~ O O R E ] .  Though the extent of the appellate courts' power to issue 
writs of mandamus is often treated as a "jurisdictional" question, the courts have never 
limited themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of "jurisdiction" as the word is 
used in section 1651. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). See 9 MOORE 110.26, at 
283-84. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has declared that "exceptional circum- 
stances amounting to judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extra- 
ordinary remedy." Will v. United States, supra at 95. 
Indeed, in the case of LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), the High Court 
expressly affirmed the existence, finding it inherent in the All Writs Act, of the circuit courts' 
supervisory power over the district courts. Id. at 259-60. The circuit courts are obligated to 
exercise this supervisory power with sound discretion, but where there is no normal process of 
appeal by which judicial action can be reviewed, as is certainly the case when a district court 
promulgates a local rule general in application and not tied to any specific pending litiga- 
tion, an extraordinary writ is, in the words of the All Writs Act, both "necessary" and "proper." 
In such a case, a writ would issue as an appropriate exercise of the circuit court's discretion. 
9 MOORE 7 110.26, at 284-85. See Sanders v. Russell, supra. 
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the rule would entail. Justice Black once observed, "If there is any one 
thing that could strongly indicate that the Founders were wrong in re- 
posing so much trust in a free press, I would suggest that it would be for 
the press itself not to wake up to the grave danger to its freedom . . . ."88 
The duty to preserve the rights of a free press rests first, rightfully, on the 
press.89 The media should challenge the sketching ban. 
Now, the purpose of this order was at the time it was entered, and still 
is, to protect people who have business with the federal court and are 
compelled, if they want to do business, to come here. 
Some are brought by the United States Government under arrest. 
More come here because they have business with the court, have a law- 
suit pending, have to come here to attend the bankruptcy court. 
The founders of this nation 200 years ago wrote a Constitution, and 
we operate under that Constitution in this court. And you people are 
the beneficiaries of the wisdom of the founders who gave us the Constitu- 
tion. 
Now, there is a very important matter here. The Constitution of the 
United States of America gives the citizens and other people in the 
country the right to a trial, a common law trial, the kind of trial that the 
founders knew about in their time. And by that I mean this: Folks have 
the right to come here and do their business with the court without being 
pilloried. They have the right to come here and do business with the 
court and not be subjected to ridicule, hatred, contempt, and they have 
the right to come here and do business with this court without being held 
up to degradation by grotesque representations of their physical char- 
acteristics. 
We are not concerned with the geography of this courtroom. We are 
not concerned with the tables and chairs and the windows and doors and 
the contents. We are concerned with people, human beings, who have a 
constitutional right when they are compelled to come here to do business, 
88Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,400 (1967) (concurring opinion). 
89Under current doctrines on standing, it is doubtful that a member of the public in his 
role as a receiver of the news could successfully maintain an action attacking the sketching 
ban. Probably, only the media can successfully meet the requirements of standing. See, e.g., 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); cJ: Association of Data Processing Service 
Organ v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1 970). 
*In a 1973 hearing, the Utah federal district court prohibited, by amendment to a 1969 
general order, all sketches of courtroom scenes regardless of where made. See notes 3-5 supra 
and accompanying text. At that hearing the court articulated the purposes and policies under- 
lying both the 1969 general order and the 1973 amendment. The statement is reproduced 
in this appendix. I t  is taken verbatim from the reporter's transcript of the hearing. Transcript 
of Proceedings 33-39, In re KCPX Television Station, C 28-73 (D. Utah, proceedings of Feb. 
2,1973). 
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to be free from being made a public display of. 
Now, that goes not only for television and radio, it goes for the news- 
papers. Since I have been here nobody, nobody at all, has made a photo- 
graph in this courtroom, and as long as I am here nobody will. People 
have a constitutional right to be fiee from that kind of harassment, that 
kind of an interference with their constitutional right to a trial in a court- 
room that is quiet, serene, where gentlemen talk about the law, where 
witnesses are examined, cross-examined, and where the jurors sit there 
and observe what is going on without the fear, the indimidation, the 
ridicule of unwanted photographs or grotesque cartoons or caricatures. 
Now, you have seen a lot of that this week. It started with KCPX. I t  
is not finished yet. 
I said citizens are entitled to come here and not be pilloried. At the 
time this Constitution was written it was the practice for the establish- 
ment in the various communities to haul the unfortunate persons, who- 
ever they might be, male or female, down to the market place, put them 
in stocks and display them. This was the purpose, to display them to the 
curious. That appealed to prejudice and ignorance. And these cartoons, 
in the court's view of it, and the stations that run them, appeal to those in 
the community who are ignorant and prejudiced. 
And there is a constitutional right of people who must come here to 
have their business transacted not to have that done. 
Now, that is the purpose of this order, was then, is now. 
Now, the suggestion is made that this order read carefully doesn't reach 
a fellow who came in here at twelve ten, while the judge was out of the 
room and the marshals were out of the room and there was no super- 
vision in here. He says he spent ten minutes, he saw the defendant, the 
plaintiff in the lawsuit, and then he spent all afternoon until four o'clock 
doing something else away from the courtroom. And then he says he 
made these cartoons over there. That doesn't improve the situation very 
much, because it adds to the unreliable and grotesque character of his 
product. Instead of being anywhere near exact, anywhere near precise, 
anywhere near a fair representation of this room and the people in it, it 
was what he was thinking about then he would like to put in that carica- 
ture. 
Now, I saw that on the eleven o'clock news myself, so I know what it 
was. It is my duty as the judge of this court to see that the guarantees of 
the Constitution of the United States are effected. This is a constitu- 
tional court. It was not created in the Constitution. Congress was em- 
powered to set up the federal courts and the intermediate appellate 
courts, but it was contemplated by the founders. And it is here, as all you 
folks know very well, that the cases come in which people are complain- 
ing about the violation of their constitutional rights. 
Now, in the Barker case the plaintiffs were here complaining about 
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the violation of their constitutional rights, and in my view of it KCPX 
was in the process at the same time of violating another consittutional 
right of those poor, unfortunate people to have to come here. 
I t  is a tragedy to have to come to court. I t  is a disaster to have to come 
to court. Folks do not come here because they want to. They come here 
because they have to. And they have a constitutional right not to be pho- 
tographed in here, not to be drawn in grotesque shapes and forms and 
colors and displayed to the community. There is a very, very wrong in- 
fluence in that sort of stuff, and that influence is that some people would 
rather forego coming to court and seeking justice, having their rights 
vindicated, than to be subjected to notoriety, ridicule, being pilloried in 
the market place, and so cold chills run up their spines. They say, "Oh, 
let's forget it. Let's forget it." 
That is a serious, chilling effect upon the need and the desire and the 
opportunity to appear in court and have their cases heard. 
Now, this is not a small matter. In my view it is of the utmost impor- 
tance. 
Now, I have just read this order, and I must say to you, in all frank- 
ness, that I think the people at KCPX were entitled to interpret it as 
they say they did. There is that avenue of escape from the express terms 
of what I wrote, but there is no escape, no escape at all, from the spirit 
and purpose of this order. 
The vice is not whether he drew something in here or out of here; the 
vice is the pillory, the ridicule, the holding people up to hatred, con- 
tempt, degradation. It is not hard to find words for it. 
Now, the order is hereby amended, effective this date at 11:10, 
amended by adding this sentence: 
The broadcasting or reporting for broadcasting by the radio, television, 
or other means, including the newspapers, whether done in the court- 
room or its environs, in connection with any judicial proceeding, is 
hereby prohibited, whether court is actually in session or not - and em- 
phasize - whether the cartoons, artists' drawings, caricatures, or what- 
ever they may be called, are made on these premises or elsewhere. 
